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Abstract: Charles Taylor is a Canadian Philosopher who is very critical to the idea of 
distributive justice from the liberal thinkers. One of them is John Rawls, especially his thought in 
A Theory of Justice. Then, this paper will examine Taylor’s view on that idea. To do so, I analyze 
Taylor’s Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Following Aristotelian way of thinking on the 
importance of society to achieve the human good, Taylor criticizes some basic assumptions 
which support the liberal idea of justice. For him, the emergence of the idea of distributive 
justice is caused by the failure of the modern thinkers to understand the essence of human being 
and its relation to society.  
Keyword: Charles Taylor, Distributive Justice, Communitarians 
 
Abstrak: Charles Taylor adalah seorang faylasuf politik asal Kanada yang dikenal sangat kritis 
terhadap gagasan keadilan distributif yang disampaikan oleh para pemikir liberal. Di antara 
pemikir liberal yang dijadikan sasaran kritiknya itu adalah John Rawls, khususnya 
pemikirannya yang tertuang di dalam A Theory of Justice. Dengan latar belakang demikian, 
makalah ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji pandangan Taylor tentang keadilan distributif tersebut. 
Untuk itu, penulis melakukan analisis tekstual terhadap tulisan Taylor yang berjudul Philosophy 
and the Human Sciences. Dengan berpijak pada corak berpikir Aristoteles yang menekankan 
pentingnya komunitas politik bagi pencapaian tujuan hidup manusia, Taylor membantah asumsi-
asumsi dasar yang melatarbelakangi gagasan liberal tentang keadilan distributif. Baginya, 
munculnya gagasan keadilan distributif di dalam filsafat politik kontemporer adalah buah dari 
kegagalan para pemikir modern dalam memahami hakikat manusia dan kaitannya dengan 
masyarakat. 








126          Ilmu Ushuluddin, Volume 6, Nomor 2, Juli 2019 
 
Introduction 
The issue of distributive justice is one 
of major themes of contemporary political 
philosophy. Moreover, since the publication 
of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls in 
19711, the issue has been debated, primarily 
by the liberal philosophers like Rawls 
himself, Robert Nozick2, Ronald 
Dworkin3 and the communitarian 
philosophers like Charles Taylor, Michael 
Sandel4 and Michael Walzer.5 This debate 
involves the nature and scope of distributive 
justice. In turn, this debate occurs not only in 
the field of philosophy, but also in that of 
public policy in many countries. 
The questions are what is distributive 
justice? How do the liberal thinkers such as 
Rawls view justice?  How do the 
communitarian thinkers like Taylor criticize 
that liberal view of justice? What are the 
different presumptions between both schools 
of thought in contemporary political 
philosophy? How do the liberals and the 
communitarians understand on the nature of 
human being and its relation to society? 
This paper will discuss Taylor’s 
response to Rawls’ Theory of Justice based on 
his thought in the eleventh chapter 
of Philosophy and Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers Volume 2, “The Nature 
 
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971). For introduction to 
Rawls’ Thought in Bahasa Indonesia, see, Iqbal 
Hasanuddin, “Keadilan Sosial: Telaah atas Filsafat 
Politik John Rawls,” in Jurnal Kajian Agama dan 
Filsafat Refleksi, Vol. 17, No.2, November 2018.” 
2 See, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and 
Utopia (New York: Basic Book, 1981). 
3 See, Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of 
Principle (London: Harvard University Press, 1985).  
4 See, Michael J. Sandel, Liberalisme and the 
Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982).  
5 See, Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A 
Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983). 
and Scope of Distributive Justice”. In this 
paper, I want to examine the idea of 
distributive justice according to Charles 
Taylor.6 Inspired by Aristotelian political 
philosophy, Taylor criticizes the atomist 
views of distributive justice which have been 
supported by Locke and Nozick, the liberal-
egalitarian view of Rawls and the Marxian 
Views.  
This paper is organized as follow. In 
first part, I describe Taylor’s short biography 
and his position in the contemporary political 
debate as part of the communitarian thinkers. 
Then, I elaborate how Taylor differs between 
the Aristotelian social view and the Lockeian 
atomist view. Then, it is followed by analyses 
of his elaboration of the social context of the 
issue of distributive justice. Then, after 
clarifying Taylor’s opinion about the four 
major streams in contemporary political 
philosophy including his republican 
perspective, this paper will be closed by 
conclusion and comments.  
Charles Taylor and the Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism 
Charles Margrave Taylor is born in 
Montreal on November 5, 1931.  He was 
raised in a bicultural and bilingual family with 
a Protestant, English-speaking father and 
a Roman Catholic, Francophone mother. 
After completing an undergraduate degree in 
history (1952) at McGill University in 
Montreal, Taylor earned a second bachelor’s 
degree in politics, philosophy, and economics 
(1955) at Balliol College at the University of 
Oxford. He was awarded a doctorate in 
philosophy at Oxford in 1961. Most of 
 
6 It is based on Charles Taylor, Philosophy and 
the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 
II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
especially chapter of “The Nature and Scope of 
Distributive Justice”, 289-317. 




Taylor’s academic career was spent at McGill 
and Oxford. He held the Chichele 
Professorship of Social and Political Theory 
at Oxford and then become a professor 
emeritus at McGill University.7 
Taylor is a Canadian philosopher who 
has concern in a wide range of philosophical 
areas: Moral theory, theories of subjectivity, 
political theory, epistemology, hermeneutics, 
the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of 
language, aesthetics, and religion.8  In those 
philosophical areas, he writes many works 
that make him famous around the world. Most 
of his great philosophical ideas can be read in 
Hegel (1975), Hegel and Modern Society 
(1979), the Sources of the Self (1989), and A 
Secular Age (2007). He also writes some 
articles which then are published as books in 
Philosophy and Human Sciences (Volume 1 
and 2). 
In his Hegel (1975)9 and Hegel and 
Modern Society (1979),10 Taylor does a 
comprehensive study of the philosophy of 
Hegel. Especially, he places Hegel’s position 
in the history of modern ideas, and his 
relevance and importance for our society 
today. Besides, Taylor also elaborates the key 
concepts of Hegel Philosophy such as the 
dialectics of being, nothing and becoming, 
and then spirit, consciousness, subjectivity, 
rationality, morality, society, state, history, 
and so on. In short, he engages with Hegel 
sympathetically, on Hegel's own terms in 
detail. So, what is the different between Hegel 
and Hegel and Modern Society? The two 
 
7 Ruth Abbey, “Charles Taylor” in Encyclopedia 
Britannica (http://www.britannica.com), read in 
December 30, 2019. 
8 Ruth Abbey, “Charles Taylor”. 
9 Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975). 
10 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
books are the study about Hegel’s philosophy. 
The first book is the long version, while the 
second is the short version. The second is the 
essential summary of the first. 
In his book, The Sources of the Self 
(1989),11 Taylor studies on what makes the 
identity of modern individuality. This book 
involves discussions about identity and the 
good, inwardness’, the affirmation of ordinary 
life, the voice of nature, and subtler language. 
His idea in The Sources of Self is coloring all 
his other writings in many areas. His thinking 
on distributive justice is also shown through 
his idea of sources of self. Some 
commentators see this book as Taylor’s 
Magnum Opus. 
In his A Secular Age (2007),12 Taylor 
engages himself in 21st-century debates about 
the role of religion in modern Western 
societies. This book studies some of the major 
changes in Christian belief in Western 
societies in the last several centuries. The 
study examines how the modern individuals 
understand themselves, their society, and the 
natural world in a purely secular way without 
reference to the divine or to a religious realm. 
In the last five centuries, as Taylor says, the 
“social imaginary” of modern people stands 
in contrast to the condition that existed in 
1500 and before, when the idea of God was 
very central in all areas of social and political 
life. 
In his Philosophy and Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers 2,13 Taylor confronts 
John Rawls’ Theory of Justice.14 Taylor 
 
11 Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self: The 
Making of Modern Identity (Boston: Harvard 
University Press, 1989). 
12 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Boston: 
Harvard University Press, 2007). 
13 Charles Taylor, Philosophy and Human 
Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2. 
14 Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 
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argues that Rawls had mistakenly defined 
justice in a non-anthropocentric way so it is 
only discussed on an epistemological level as 
if the meaning of justice were universally the 
same. Justice cannot be viewed as universally 
the same as if it is something unhistorical and 
unsocial because fundamentally, we could not 
view people as an atomistic subjectivity but 
holistic subjectivity. Together with Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Michael Walzer and Michael 
Sandel, Taylor are associated with a 
communitarian critique of liberal theory’s 
understanding of the “self”. Following 
Aristotle and Hegel, Communitarians 
emphasize the importance of social 
institutions in the development of individual 
meaning and identity. 
According to Will Kymlicka in his 
Contemporary Political Philosophy, the 
communitarians offers the idea of 
‘constitutive ends’ and ‘the embedded self’ as 
alternative to the liberal belief of rational 
subjectivity who can revise, question, or even 
reject, the traditions and practices of his 
society. So, the communitarians like Taylor 
urge a social context for individual freedom. 
This means that the communitarians also 
concern about the idea of freedom like the 
liberals do, but the communitarians see the 
importance of society to exercise that 
freedom. For the communitarians, without 
society, the idea of freedom only becomes a 
jargon.15 
The Notion of Human Dignity behind the 
Principles of Distributive Justice 
Taylor starts his analyses on the issue of 
distributive justice by asking a question as 
follows: what kind of good is distributive 
 
15 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political 
Philosophy: An Introduction (Second Edition), 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 271. 
justice? Asking this question shows us that he 
is one of the communitarian thinkers who 
hold that justice is a kind of the good life 
which people try to seek. It also presupposes 
that for him there is another kind of good 
outside the principles of distributive justice.16 
To answer this question, Taylor refers 
to Rawls’ formulation of circumstances of 
justice. As Taylor says, Rawls views that the 
separated human being collaborating in 
conditions of moderate scarcity is 
circumstances for justice, especially 
distributive justice. Then, is that distributive 
justice also relevant to other circumstances?17 
Taylor invites us to consider a different 
circumstance that is the case of two nomadic 
tribes meeting in the desert; there are quite 
independent human beings, not bound 
together by any society or collaborative 
arrangement. In this condition, according to 
Taylor, there are very old and long-standing 
intuitions about justice which tells us as 
follow: it is wrong (unjust) for one to steal the 
flocks of the other. It is obvious that the 
proviso here is simple: we have a right to 
what we have.18 
Although there is proviso saying “we 
have a right to what we have”, one tribe has 
natural duty to help another tribe when the 
latter is starving. If the former refuses to help, 
the latter could legitimately steal from the 
former. Another way of stating this is that the 
starving tribe could take over what the other 
tribe has when it refuses to help.19 
Taylor takes the case of tribes above as 
exemplars of men or people in what is called 
the State of Nature. The basic point here is 
that there no such thing as distributive justice 
 
16 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 289. 
17 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 289.  
18 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 289. 
19 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 290. 




in the State of Nature. In Taylor’s opinion, the 
proviso saying “we have a right to what we 
have” above is not a principle of distributive 
justice presupposing that men are in some 
kind of collaborative arrangement. Then, 
‘acting according to the natural duty is not the 
same thing as acting according to justice’.20 
For Taylor, this raises another question: 
in what way do the principles of distributive 
justice differ from those of justice among 
independent agents, namely, agents in the 
State of Nature? And what is about human 
society that makes the difference? Even not 
recognized as a question by many thinkers, 
that question is claimed by Taylor as the 
fundamental one. The right answer to the 
question would make the issue of distributive 
justice increasingly clear for us.21 
Taylor holds that there is an implicit 
presupposition in the principles of distributive 
justice: the Kantian term of human dignity. 
By virtue of this human dignity, human 
beings enjoy the status which animals and 
plants don’t. Human being is beings who 
demand certain respect. Then, all human 
beings ought to be treated equally. Without 
giving respect and equal concern when we 
deal with someone, this means that we do not 
consider him or her as a human being.22 
For Taylor, the problem is that there has 
been widespread disagreement on what 
human dignity consists in. This disagreement, 
in turn, has caused the disputes about the 
nature of distributive justice. The more the 
notion of human dignity is unexplored, the 
more the nature of distributive justice is 
unclear. Unfortunately, as Taylor notes, this 
discussion about human dignity has become 
 
20 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 290. 
21 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 290. 
22 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 290. 
disappeared in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical 
tradition since Seventeenth-century.23 
To make the nature of distributive 
justice clear, according to Taylor, we have to 
clarify the notion of human dignity. Taylor 
suggests that our notion of human dignity is 
in turn bound up with a conception of the 
human good, that is, our answer to the 
question, what is the good man? What is the 
good human life? This also involves the 
questions about the relation between man and 
the society when realizing his good. In turn, 
this brings us to the ethical problem since 
Aristotle’s time.24 
In the following section, I will explore 
the different views of human subject between 
the Aristotelian Social View and the Lockeian 
Atomist View according to Taylor. In my 
own opinion, these differences are central to 
his critical examination about the nature and 
scope of distributive justice. While criticizing 
the Lockeian atomist view about human 
subject and its implications to the notion of 
justice, Taylor offers the concept of justice 
based on the Aristotelian notion of human 
beings as zoonpolitikon (social animal). 
The Differences between the Social View 
and the Atomist View 
Taylor elaborates a number of the 
differences between the social view and the 
atomist view. These differences involve the 
notions of the human good, the human 
dignity, the principles of justice and some 
arguments for the principles of justice. Some 
contrasts of them will be best viewed as 
follow. 
The first is the notion of human good. 
Taylor argues that in the atomist view it is 
possible for human being to attain human 
 
23 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 291. 
24 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 291. 
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good without the existence of association or 
community. Why? The atomist view holds 
that the function of association or community 
is just to give some aids needed in realizing 
the human good. For example, association is 
needed to protect human being against 
attacks. In other words, for the atomist view, 
association has just an instrumental, not 
substantial function.25 
By contrast the social view argues that 
association has a substantive role in realizing 
the human good. It is very implausible to 
attain the good without the existence of 
association or community. To put the issue in 
the Taylor’s term, for the social view believes 
that ‘the essential constitutive condition of 
seeking the human good is bound up with 
being in society’. For the social view, then, 
the function of association or community is 
not only instrumental to give some aid, but 
also substantial to make seeking the good 
possible for human being.26 
Putting himself in the proponents of the 
social view, Taylor also claims that ‘man 
cannot even be a moral subject, and thus a 
candidate for the realization of the human 
good, outside of a community of language 
and mutual discourse about the good and bad, 
just and unjust’. For Taylor and the other 
opponents of the social view, there is no 
seeking the good without a kind of 
community. The existence of community, 
thus, is the condition of possibility in 
realizing the human good.27 
The second is the notion of human 
dignity. To restate Taylor’s way of putting the 
issue, both the atomist view and the social 
view have their respective notions of human 
dignity based on the different notions of 
 
25 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 292. 
26 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 292. 
27 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 292. 
human good. For the atomist view, human 
dignity is quite independent of society. So, it 
is possible for the atomist like Locke to 
ascribe rights to man alone outside of society, 
namely, in the State of Nature. As a contrast 
to this atomist view, the social view suggests 
that human dignity is really bound up in some 
form of society. Thus, there is no possibility 
to realize human dignity outside of society.28 
The third is the principles of justice. 
Taylor sees the atomist view ascribing the 
principles of justice from the aims of 
association. In this case, Taylor considers 
Lockeian view as an example. For Locke, the 
aim of the establishment of association is to 
preserve property including life, liberty and 
estate. Because all people who enter the 
association freely want to get benefit from it, 
there should be a principle assuring all 
members can fulfill equally their respective 
goals of life. Thus, there should be the 
principle of equal fulfillment. Unless there is 
this principle, people actually have no reasons 
to join the association. Without this principle, 
they would possibly scarify themselves for 
others by getting less than they give.29 
According to Taylor, the principles of 
justice endorsed by the atomist view like 
Locke presupposed that there are rights of 
man before entering the association. Those 
rights are alienable the association has to 
preserve. It is forbidden for the association 
and its members to violate those alienable 
rights, namely, the rights to life, liberty and 
estate. As Taylor notes, this presupposition 
also can be seen in Nozick’s entitlement 
theory of justice.30 
To paraphrase Taylor’s view, the 
principle justice of the atomist view based on 
 
28 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 292-293. 
29 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 293. 
30 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 293. 




the equal fulfillment is a kind of the principles 
of distributive justice. These principles of 
justice of the atomist view require two things. 
Firstly, the benefit of the association has to be 
shared equally among its members. This 
benefit involves the opportunity to fulfill 
equally the aims of the members of the 
association. Secondly, the principles of 
distributive justice have a limit which is 
forbidden to transgress, that is the alienable 
rights involving the rights to life, liberty and 
estate.31 
As contrast to the principles which 
belong to the atomist view, Taylor argues that 
there is no kind of the principles of justice in 
the social view. Because the realization of 
human dignity is bound up with some form of 
society, there is no fixed framework for 
distribution applied to all form societies in all 
spatio-temporal conditions. In the social view, 
the framework for distribution can determined 
for a prevailing society by the nature of the 
common goods they seek. Thus, because there 
are so many forms of society in all times and 
around the world, the framework for 
distribution varies historically.32 
Taylor adds this by saying that the 
members of society seeking the common 
good are all in each other’s debt. While some 
people give their contribution to the common 
deliberative life of society, the others make 
sure its integrity. Although there should be 
the balance of mutual indebtedness among the 
members, it is not entirely reciprocal. In this 
condition, there are possibly people who 
deserve more than other because they are 
more in their debt than other.33 
As I have noted, based on his 
elaboration above, we can see that Taylor 
 
31 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 293. 
32 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 296. 
33 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 298. 
does not believe that the principles of 
distributive justice have to be applied taken 
for granted. For Taylor, whether the 
principles are applied or not depend on the 
form of association or community. So, what 
he rejects is not the principles of distributive 
justice in itself, but the atomist view who 
believing that these principles have to be 
applied based on the notion of man alone 
without any considerations of the contexts of 
society. What is important for Taylor is not 
the principles themselves, but the form of 
society in which the members attempt to seek 
their good in common. 
The Context of Distributive Justice 
Before exploring Taylor’s opinion on 
the issues of distributive justice in the 
perspectives of contemporary political 
philosophy, I will clarify its socio-political 
contexts. Fortunately, it is easy to do so 
because Taylor himself has tried to make it 
clear from the outset. Moreover, this 
clarification of its socio-political contexts is 
really important in the line of Taylor’s 
argument. 
Taylor argues that there are two areas 
arising constantly in the modern society. The 
first is the area of differentials which is the 
question of allowable differences between 
wages or income received for different kind 
of work. The second is an attempt in 
equalization policy involving redistribution of 
income or economic prosperity, or life 
opportunities by which transfer payments or 
special programs to develop certain regions, 
etc. This equalization polices have a 
significant correlation to the issue of 
distributive justice.34 
While Taylor does not give a satisfying 
explanation to the question why there are so 
 
34 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 303. 
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many aspirations to equality in modern 
society, he explains much more the historical 
background for that resistance to equalization. 
According to Taylor, it is easy for the 
comparatively better-off to refuse the politics 
of redistribution. What is important here is 
how he relates the refusal of redistribution to 
the process of privatization in the life of 
modern society. In his opinion, there is a 
common view generally accepted in Western 
industrial society that happiness and the good 
life can be attained by a man alone. Thus, 
society is only seen as an instrument, not as a 
locus in which human beings can develop 
their potentialities.35 
Taylor holds that there is a tension 
between the attempt to equalization and its 
resistance. Consequently, at the same time, 
there is also tension between the proponents 
of politics of redistribution and its opponents. 
Both have different views and feelings on the 
policy of redistribution. For the proponents, 
the policy of redistribution is a must in order 
to make just society. On the contrary, the 
opponents see it as injustice because it has 
sacrificed the affluent.36 
While made by politicians who are 
always interested in mass vote, the policy of 
redistribution is only possible by taxation of 
the affluent. Time by time, the cost of policy 
becomes more expensive. As a result, for the 
middle classes or the affluent paying tax more 
than other, redistributive policy seems to be in 
favor of the less endowed and the less hard-
working. In turn, they feel a sense of 
grievance. Thus, they see it not only 
jeopardizing but also violating their property 
rights. At the end, they see and feel that 
policy is really unjust.37 
 
35 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 304. 
36 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 306-307. 
37 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 307. 
Taylor holds that this condition has 
given a climate for forms of reasoning about 
distributive justice to increase that are the 
atomist views. For him, one of the atomist 
views is the Lockeian atomist view. On this 
view, men had in State of Nature an 
independent capacity to exploit the natural 
resources and then to found property. When 
entering society, men need this society as an 
association which makes sure the safety of 
their property. As Taylor notes, of course now 
almost no one can believe this idea of State of 
Nature. Contrary, majority people in Western 
society believe that they are working within 
large and complex structure of society.38 
Beside the Lockeian version, according 
to Taylor, there is also another atomist view 
which suggests that the individual is not seen 
as possessor of property, but as an 
independent being with his or her own 
capacities and goals. Thus, the aims of 
association are not to protect property as 
convinced by the Lockeian version, but to 
combine all individual capacities in order to 
make the resultant product more productive 
than each would be alone. Because the 
capacities of every individual vary, thus there 
should be the different shares among all 
individuals. Based on the principle of equal 
fulfillment, the individual who has useful 
capacities in collaboration with others in 
association or society ought to get a greater 
share of the product resulted.39 
Taylor sees that the issue of 
contribution is very important in the latter 
atomist view above. How much someone gets 
the share of the resultant product is 
determined by a principle that is his or her 
contribution to association. Because of it, 
Taylor calls this the contribution principle. 
 
38 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 305. 
39 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 305. 




According to Taylor, this contribution 
principle is the very bases of the principles of 
distributive justice embraced by the 
protagonists of the contemporary atomist 
view. Of course, the contribution principle is 
more sophisticated than the Lockeian version. 
And this is the reason why the contribution 
principle is more applicable in the context of 
distributive justice today.40 
According to Taylor, this contribution 
principle lies behind the resistance to the 
policy of redistribution. As noted above, the 
more the individual gives contribution to 
society by his or her capacities, the more he 
or she gets share of product; on the contrary, 
the less he or she gives contribution, the less 
he or she gets share of product. Based on this 
contribution principle, there is an intuition 
about relative value of doctors, lawyers, ship 
pilot, and so on deserving high income. So, 
they consider themselves as people who have 
justified differential remuneration. 
Main Streams in Contemporary Political 
Philosophy 
Regarding the issue of redistributive 
policy or of distributive justice, Taylor has 
explained two kinds of atomist views which 
are respectively ascribed to John Locke and 
Robert Nozick. Then, He adds this by two 
other main streams in contemporary political 
philosophy that are Marxists and the liberal-
egalitarian which ascribed to John Rawls. 
While giving a critical examination to those 
four major streams, Taylor tries to offer the 
republican political thought as an alternative. 
In presenting Rawls’ idea of distributive 
justice, Taylor does not give any comments 
too much. He just suggests that Rawls has 
answered the wrong question. For Taylor, 
Rawls has established a sort of principles of 
 
40 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 305. 
justice without considering historical and 
cultural variations in the kinds of association 
to address and of the goods to seek. Indeed, 
Taylor argues that Rawls put his theory of 
justice in the context of ‘the social union of 
social union’ and then interpreted as the 
mutual involvement in society. Taylor also 
holds that Rawls tries to address the common 
good consisting of (a) equal liberty and (b) 
the more far-reaching equality.41 
Although Taylor does not consider 
Rawls’ theory of distributive justice as a kind 
of atomist view, he rejects Rawls’ theory 
because of its tendency to egalitarianism 
which more than what now American 
practices. Taylor indicates this egalitarianism 
by showing that Rawls’ idea of the difference 
principle ‘represents an agreement to regard 
the distribution of natural talents as a common 
asset and to share in the benefits of this 
distribution whatever it turns out to be’. For 
Taylor, this Rawls’ egalitarianism is contrary 
to the view of man and society presupposed 
by the contribution principle. Thus, Taylor 
believes that the proponents of the 
contribution principle have some objection 
which Rawls could not answer.42 
Taylor also puts Marxists in the 
proponents of egalitarianism like Rawls with 
the greater tendency. But, for Taylor, Marxian 
political philosophy does not have something 
to do with the idea of distributive justice. This 
is really plausible because Marxists just 
concerns to the issue of production, not 
distribution. For Marxist, the truly justice can 
only be attained in a classless society. So, 
further examination to Marxian political 
philosophy is considered by Taylor 
irrelevant.43 
 
41 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 308. 
42 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 308. 
43 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 307-308. 
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Then, Taylor tries to show the basis 
error of the atomist views. For him, the main 
problem is not its idea of individuality itself 
but that of atomism. In this way, the atomist 
views ‘fail to consider that the free individual 
with his own goals and aspirations is only 
possible with a certain civilization’. At this 
point, Taylor holds that the modern individual 
is a product of certain context of society 
which endorses it by its rule of law, its rule of 
equal respect, and so on. Without these, the 
very individuality in modern society is 
impossible.44 
Especially, Taylor points out the idea of 
liberty to show the existence of society as a 
context to seek the good that is liberty. To 
exercise liberty, we need not only liberty in 
our mind, but also the social condition 
supporting it. For Taylor, this social context is 
really important to realize liberty. So, this 
view suggests the social view that liberty as a 
human good can only be attained in a certain 
form of society in which liberty is bound up.45 
Taylor also talks about the opinion of 
defender of a mitigated contribution principle 
arguing that there is not only liberty as the 
good to seek, but also the other goods such as 
honor, prosperity and so on. At this point, 
society does not only have to protect liberty 
of its members, but also to serve prosperity 
and honor. According to Taylor, it means that 
each view of main streams in political 
philosophy corresponds to a dimension of 
contemporary social life. 
Consequently, Taylor claims, that the 
contemporary society cannot be understood 
within the frames of a single theory of 
distributive justice. In economic field, there is 
possible to set a theory of distributive justice, 
not only between two parts in a state, but also 
 
44 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 309. 
45 Taylor, The Nature and Scope..., 310. 
among all parts around the world; in the 
cultural field, there is also possible to 
establish a theory of distributive justice in the 
framework of multiculturalism. Because of 
this reasons, according to Taylor, we have to 
abandon the search for a single set of 
principles of distributive justice. 
Is the fact of complexity and 
multidimensionality of the issue of 
distributive justice problematic? For sure, 
Taylor says: no problem at all. For Taylor, it 
seems like what emerges in the Aristotle’s 
discourse of justice. Quoting Aristotle saying, 
Taylor says that ‘those who adopt a single 
exclusive principle speak of a part of justice 
only’. Then, Taylor closes his critical 
examination on the issue of distributive 
justice by saying about the republican society. 
The common citizenship of that republican 
society requires as follows: the first is a 
certain degree of equality; and the second is 
the balance of mutual indebtedness. 
Conclusion and Comments 
Before concluding and giving some 
comments, let me first summarize the main 
point of this paper. For Taylor, there are two 
views of the nature of distributive justice 
those are the social view and the atomist 
view. There are a number of the differences 
between the social view and the atomist view. 
These differences involve the notions of the 
human good, the human dignity, the 
principles of justice and some arguments for 
the principles of justice. 
According to Taylor, the atomist view 
holds that it is possible for human being to 
attain human good without the existence of 
association or community. Why? The atomist 
view sees that the function of association or 
community is just to give some aids needed in 
realizing the human good. For example, 




association is needed to protect human being 
against attacks. In other words, for the atomist 
view, association has just an instrumental, not 
substantial function. 
By contrast the social view argues that 
association has a substantive role in realizing 
the human good. It is very implausible to 
attain the good without the existence of 
association or community. To put the issue in 
the Taylor’s term, for the social view believes 
that ‘the essential constitutive condition of 
seeking the human good is bound up with 
being in society’. For the social view, then, 
the function of association or community is 
not only instrumental to give some aid, but 
also substantial to make seeking the good 
possible for human being. 
Putting himself in the proponents of the 
social view, Taylor also claims that ‘man 
cannot even be a moral subject, and thus a 
candidate for the realization of the human 
good, outside of a community of language 
and mutual discourse about the good and bad, 
just and unjust’. For Taylor and the other 
proponents of the social view, there is no 
seeking the good without a kind of 
community. The existence of community, 
thus, is the condition of possibility in 
realizing the human good. 
Then, Taylor has elaborated the four 
main streams in contemporary political 
philosophy debating over the scope of 
distributive justice. Those are atomist views 
which are respectively ascribed to John Locke 
and Robert Nozick, Marxists and the liberal-
egalitarian which ascribed to John Rawls. 
While giving a critical elaboration to those 
four major streams, Taylor tries to offer the 
republican political thought as an alternative. 
He considers himself as a republican 
philosopher. 
Talking as a republican philosopher, 
Taylor holds that the contemporary society 
cannot be understood within the frames of a 
single theory of distributive justice. So, 
according to Taylor, we have to abandon the 
search for a single set of principles of 
distributive justice. Then he ends talking on 
the issue of distributive justice by saying 
about the republican society. For him, the 
common citizenship of that republican society 
requires as follows: the first is a certain 
degree of equality; and the second is the 
balance of mutual indebtedness. 
Then now let me give some critical 
comments on Taylor’s thinking on the issue 
of distributive justice. Firstly, in my opinion, 
Taylor has not concerned with the idea of 
distributive justice itself as thought by 
thinkers like Rawls and Nozick. What he has 
concerned is the ontological presupposition 
behind its idea. Thus, it can be said that the 
focus of Taylor analyses is not the content of 
distributive justice, but the context of it. Who 
wants to get, for example, a deep 
interpretation on Rawlsian and Nozickian 
ideas of distributive justice according to 
Taylor would be disappointed. In his analyses 
above, we cannot get his normative critics to 
both Rawls and Nozick. 
Secondly, I see that it is unclear whether 
Taylor put Rawls in the proponents of atomist 
views or not. It seems for me that he put 
Rawls outside of the proponents of atomist 
views. Taylor says: 
“Perhaps the fullest description of 
this society is to be found in 
section79 of A Theory of Justice, 
where Rawls describes it as ‘the 
social union of social unions.’ If 
this Humboldtian vision were 
correct about the nature of our 
mutual involvement in society, 
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and the kinds of common good we 
seek, then indeed, (a) equal liberty 
would be an essential background 
feature (and hence would have 
priority) and (b) we would be 
bound to accept the more far-
reaching equality Rawls 
prescribes.”46 
So, does it mean that Rawls holds the 
social view? It is still not clarified. 
Thirdly, I suggest that Taylor’s political 
philosophy echoes not only Aristotelian 
republican way of thinking, but also the 
Hegelian Sittlichkeit.47 He uses those two 
sources to criticize the liberal form of 
thought, especially its atomist presupposition. 
Of course, as the matter of content of 
normative thought, there is no sharp contrast 
between Taylor and thinker like Rawls. But, 
Taylor tells us how we could give appropriate 
analyses to the social context before talking 
something normative like the issue of 
distributive justice. Then, although there is no 
an absolute novelty in Taylor’s idea of 
distributive justice, there will be benefit to 
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